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This paper examines the effect of introducing insider trading restrictions on daily
stock price and trading volume behaviour of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. From
1987 on, insiders are no longer allowed to trade two months before annual earnings
announcements and three weeks before semi-annual earnings announcements. Our
results indicate that, stocks became less liquid when insiders were not allowed to
trade. Although the law may have increased the willingness of outsiders to trade
before earnings announcements, this increase in liquidity is offset by the reduction
in trading volume generated by insiders. We also find no evidence that the intro-
duction of insider trading restrictions significantly reduced the stock market's speed
of adjustment to earnings announcements.
Version: April 19911. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1987, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (ASE)
adopted a Model Code, restricting insider trading before
major announcements such as earnings, dividends and new
equity issues. The main purpose of this study is to test
whether the introduction of this regulation had any
material impact on the behaviour of stock prices and
trading volume on the ASE. Specifically, this paper
tests for the "conventional wisdom" about insider
trading, i.e., that it reduces outside investors'
confidence and that it makes markets more informationally
efficient.
Kyle (1985) develops a model that formalises this
"conventional" intuition. In his model a monopolistic
insider who has unique access to private information
about the underlying asset trades against uninformed
noise traders (who trade randomly) and against market
makers who set prices on the basis of the aggregate order
flow. The insider trades in such a way that his private
information is incorporated gradually into prices, so
that markets become more ínformationally efficient. of
course, it would be preferable (as Manove (1989) argues)
that the insider directly communicated his ínformation to
the public, in the same way as the world would be a
better place if there were only nice, altruistic people'1
Kyle's model also captures Bagehot's (1971) intuition
that market makers compensate themselves for bad tradesz
due to adverse selection of insiders by making the market
less liquid ( see also Amihud and Mendelsohn ( 1986)).
However, Grossman (1986) points out that if many traders
are participating in a market because they have private
information and are trying to earn a return on this
information, then this will increase the liquidity of the
market. Adamati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that a
reduction in the number of informed traders may actually
reduce market depth and liquidity because it reduces
competition between informed traders. The resulting
increase in transaction costs may influence the behaviour
of "discretionary" traders, i.e., traders that have
liquidity demands that need not be satisfied immediately.
If transaction costs increase prior to earnings
announcements, these traders may prefer to wait until
after the public release of the earnings news, so that
liquidity prior to such announcements will fall.
Moreover, the argument that insider trading makes markets
more efficient depends crucially on the degree of
competition between insiders (see e.g. Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1989)). Under perfect
competition, prices become so informationally efficient
and trading profits so low that, when the degree of risk-
aversion among informed traders is small, information
traders have no incentive to collect information (so that
markets "cannot" be efficient). Hence, insider trading
restrictions may increase incentives for other3
information traders (financial analysts etc.) to collect
costly information (Fishman and Hagerty (1989)) so that
it is an empirical issue whether insider trading makes
markets more efficient. The Dutch regulatory environment
provides an ideal experimental setting to perform such a
test.
This paper is organised as follows. In section two we
describe the 1987 Model Code and develop a set of
testable hypotheses about price and volume behaviour. In
section three we present the data. Section four studies
the effect of the regulation on trading volume. Section
five tests whether the Model Code made markets less
efficient around earnings announcements. Section six
summarizes our major conclusions.
2. THE 1987 MODEL CODE: HYPOTHESES
Under impulse of the initiative of the European
Commission to create a unified European market by 1993,
more and more countries have been following the
recommendations of the EEC directive of 25 July 1977 to
introduce some restrictions on insider trading. Hence,
on January 1 1987 the Amsterdam Stock Exchange adopted a
Model Code which restricts insider trading before the
most common company-specific announcements. Insiders (as
defined by the law) are no longer allowed to trade in the
company's stock (1) during the two months preceding the
announcement of annual earnings reports (2) 21 days4
preceding the announcement of semi-annual earnings and
dividends and (3) 1 month preceding the announcement of
new equity issues. All insider transactions are
registered in the company, but are not made public
(unlike in the U.S. where the Official Summary of Insider
Transactions is publicly available). The company
official charged with recording the transactions is
supposed to warn insiders that a"forbidden trading
period" has started (Baron van Ittersum (1989)). In
order to detect violations of the Code, a Stock Watch
committee looks for abnormal movements in prices and
trading volume. When the committee suspects a violation,
it will conduct an investigation. In 1987, 1988 and
1989, 14, 18 and 10 (respectively) suspect cases were
investigated. If a violation is found, the company's
name is made public; in case of a serious violation the
company is reprimanded. In 1987, 1988 and 1989, 3, 1 and
2(respectively) offences were identified. In only one
case a company was reprimanded by the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange. Repeat offenders could be delisted from the
stock exchange. On 2 February 1989 legislation was
passed by the Dutch parliament which imposes heavy fines
and jail terms (up to two years) for insiders who violate
the Model Code.
The purpose of this paper is to test the consequences of
restricting insider trading on the liquidity of equity
markets and the speed of adjustment to information
revealed in annual and semi-annual earnings5
announcements. The law also restricted trading before
dividend announcements and new issues. However, because
dividends are typically announced the same day as
earnings, no independent test of dividend announcements
is possible. Announcements of new equity issues were
also ignored because we want to focus on the behaviour of
markets before predictable events: earnings are each year
announced in the same calendar week.
Specifically, we want to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. After insider trading was restricted,
markets became more liquid in the restricted period
(prior to earnings announcements).
Hypothesis 2: After insider trading was restricted, the
speed of adjustment to annual and semi-annual earnings
information was reduced.
Hypothesis 3. These effects are more pronounced for
small firms.
The first two hypotheses test the conventional wisdom
that the increased willingness of outsiders to trade
compensated for the loss of trading volume normally
generated by insiders and that insider trading makes
markets efficient. The third hypothesis tests whether
small firms, which are generally perceived to offer more
profit potential to insiders are more affected by
restrictions on insider trading.6
Note that testing these hypotheses is only meaningful if
the Model Code deters insider trading. There exists a
lot of evidence (Jaffe (1987), Finnerty (1976), Seyhun
(1986)) that insiders (officers and dírectors) buy before
price increases and sell prior to price declines in U.S.
capital markets. One interpretation of these results is
that exploitation of insider information is widespread
and that insiders violate Rule lOb-5 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. Considering that these
violations carry heavy fines and jail sentences, it seems
questionable whether the comparatively mild sanctions
(before February 1989) are sufficient to enforce the
Dutch Model Code. However, Givoly and Palmon (1986) find
no association between purchase (sale) transactions with
the release of subsequent good (bad) news. They argue
that the price changes subsequent to insider trading
transactions are mainly reflecting the publication of the
trades themselves. One explanation for their results is
that insider purchases (sales) are a sign of increased
(decreased) managerial commitment to shareholder value
maximization (i.e. a reduction in agency costs), and not
activities related to inside information. Hence, the
requirement to publish insider transactions (in the
Official Summary) and the stiff legal penalties may be a
sufficient deterrent to widespread exploitation of inside
information in U.S. capital markets. Whether the Dutch
Model Code with its mild sanctions has a similar effect
is an interesting empirical issue.7
3. DATA
All 136 stocks that were continuously listed on the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange from January 1984 until June
1989 were considered. The daily stock prices were
obtained from Data Stream Inc. and adjusted for dividends
and other distributions. Data on daily trading volume
were collected from Stockdata and the financial press (De
Officiele Prijscourant and Het Financiele Dagblad). 11
firms were dropped because stock price data was not
available on the Data Stream tape.
In addition we collected data on annual and semi-annual
earnings announcements. Data for the year 1987 through
1989 were collected from the press releases of the
Alcremeen Nederlands Persbureau (ANP, the Dutch Press
Agency). Because the ANP only saves the prevíous two
years announcements, the remaining announcement dates are
collected by searching the financial press (Het
Financiele Dagblad). Because we were unable to find
announcements for a number of companies, our final sample
is reduced to approximately 114 firms. All earnings per
share and dividend per share numbers were also collected
independently from the "Financieel Economisch Lexicon".
The distribution of the 561 annual and 554 semi-annual
earnings announcements is shown in Table 1. Most annual
earnings are announced in March and April, while most
semi-annual earnings announcements take place in August
and September.8
4. THE EFFECT OF INSIDER TRADING RESTRICTION ON TRADING
VOLUME
4.1 Methodolocry
The purpose of this section of the paper is to test
whether the Model Code increased liquidity before annual
earnings and semi-annual earnings announcements. Because
the regulation restricted insider trading 2 months (or 40
trading days) before an annual earnings announcement and
3 weeks (or 15 trading days) before a semi-annual
announcement, we consider the following event periods:
day -50 to day f10, for annual earnings announcements and
day -25 to day f10 for semi-annual earnings
announcements. The 10 extra days on both sides of the
restricted trading period are added to test for potential
shifts in trading behaviour. Beside event periods, we
also define the estimation ~eriod as the 100 day period
covering day -100 until day -51 and day fll until day
t60. To make trading volume comparable over time, the
number of shares traded in each day was divided by the
number of shares outstanding on that day (see e.g. Beaver
(1968) and Morse (1981) for a similar procedure).
In order to compute the Model Code induced change in
trading volume in the event period, we first need a model
of expected "normal" (unrelated to earnings
announcements) trading volume. The "abnormal" (earnings
related) trading volume in the test period can then be
compared before and after the introduction of the Model
Code. In this paper, we assume that the normal trading9
volume is generated by the Market Model, which assumes
that the expected volume has a company specific component
and a market component :
EíVit) - ai f bi VMt (1)
ai and bi are constants estimated using data in the
estimation period and VI„It is the average trading volume
of our portfolio of 114 securities on day t.
Ajinka and Jain (1989) argue that the Market Model
specification, adjusted for serial correlation,
outperforms other model specifications employed in the
finance and accounting literature. Because insider
trading may induce serial correlation in trading volume
data, no adjustment for serial correlation was made : as
we are trying to measure informatíon índuced abnormal
trading volume, adjusting for serial correlation would
imply overadjusting the model of normal, expected trading
volumez.
On the basis of this model, abnormal and average abnormal
(earnings announcement related) trading volume will be
computed on each day in the event period and compared
before and after the 1987 regulation.
In order to test for statistically significant
differences in trading volume behaviour for different
subsamples, we need an estimate (for each subsample) of10
the standard deviation of the average daily abnormal
trading volume. This standard deviation is computed
using data in the 100 day estimation period. A similar
procedure (for security prices) is developed in Brown and
Warner (1985). By using time series of average
(abnormal) trading volume, the tests incorporate cross-
sectional dependence in the security specific (abnormal)
trading volume.
The event period is split up in four subperiods :
- The pre-restricted ,-period . day -50 to day -41 for
annual announcements and day -25 to day - 16 for semi-
annual announcements
- The restricted period : day -40 to day -1 for annual
announcements and day -15 to day -1 for semi-annual
announcements
- The announcement period: day 0 plus day 1
- The post-announcement period : day 2 to day l0
Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of the estimation
and event-(sub) periods around annual earnings
announcements
4.2. Results : annual earnings
Table II provides some descriptive statistics for our
daily volume data (i.e. the fraction of shares traded)
from January 1984 to June 1989, for three subperiods .11
the entire year (panel A), the estimation period (panel
B) and the event period (panel C). On average, .244
percent of the outstanding shares were traded per day (or
61 percent of the outstanding shares per year). After
restrictions on insider trading were introduced (i.e.
after 1986) trading volume seems to have declined from
.268 percent per day to .216 percent per day. Panel B
and Panel C show that this decline in average trading
occurs also in the estimation period and the event
period. For annual earnings announcements, daily trading
volume is, on average, .036 percent larger in the event
period than in the estimation period. The corresponding
number for semi-annual earnings announcements is .04
percent. All panels show a rather dramatic decline in
trading volume in 1987. Note that, the distribution of
trading volume is positively skewed. Ajinka and Jain
(1989), report similar results . the average daily
trading volume in the U.S. is 0.159, and skewed to the
left.
In order to deal with non-normality, the trading volume
data were transformed by taking logs. Specífically, if
on a given day nt shares were traded and n0 shares were
outstanding, the transformed trading volume was computed
as ln ((1 t nt)~(n0)). Ajinka and Jain (1989) employ
another measure, (i.e. ln (1 t nt)~ln (n0)). The problem
with their adjustment method is that it not only
normalises the data, but also changes the ranking. A
numerical example will illustrate this. Assume that we12
have three observations : trading volume of 100, 900 and
l00 on stocks with, respectively, 100,000, 300,000 and
11,000 shares outstanding. Thus, the unadjusted trading
volume is .1~, .3~ and .9~ respectively, which implies a
skewed sample distribution. Taking logs (our method)
transforms these numbers into -6.907, -5.809 and -4.71
(mean - median --5.809j. The Ajinka and Jain adjustment
will create the following numbers :.4, .54, .49 (mean -
.48, median -.49). So their transformation does not
only normalise the data but also changes the ranking of
the observations : firm 2 is now classified as the firm
with the highest trading volume.
Table III shows the cumulative average abnormal trading
volume around annual earninas announcements in the event
period. The left-hand side of the tables is based on
data prior to the restriction on insider trading, while
the right-hand side shows the post-regulation results.
Table IV summarizes the results of table III by computing
the average daily abnormal trading volume around annual
earnings announcements in each of the four subperiods .
the pre-restricted period (P-50,-41)~ the 40-day
restricted period (P-40,-1), the two-day announcement
period (P0~1) and the 9-day post-announcement period
(P2,10)- Within the 40-day restricted period we examine
three subperiods P-30,-1~ P-20,-1~ P-10,-1~ Although the
regulation restricts insider trading during a 2 month
period, it seems likely that risk-averse insiders will
become more active as the earnings announcement date13
approaches. Although by waiting an individual insider
risks that information will get reflected in security
prices (e.g. by the actions of other insiders), he also
can minimize his trading risk3. Hence, we expect that
the law should have a bigger impact in period P-10,-1
than in period P-40,-1.
From tables III and IV we can infer the following .
first both before and after the introduction of insider
trading regulation, trading volume increases
significantly in the announcement beriod and in the o p st-
announcement period, a result also reported by others on
U.S. data (see e.g. Beaver (1968), Morse (1981), Bamber
(1986) and Jain (1988)). The fact that trading volume
increases when earnings are announced is typically
explained as a"lack of consensus" effect . earnings
announcements typically contain information that changes
prices, which may create disagreement and hence increase
trading volume (see e.g. Karpoff (1986)). Holthausen and
Verrechia (1990) argue that besides the lack of consensus
effect, an "informedness effect" could generate excess
trading volume . if an announcement contains a lot of
information, "agents' demands become more extreme as
agents become more knowledgeable".
The fact that trading volume is significantly positive
several days after earnings announcements is more
puzzling. Karpoff (1986) suggests that this may be a
result of market frictions that keep all demands from14
instantaneously clearing. Alternatively, these trades
may be executed by (1) speculative traders (insiders) who
trade around earnings announcements or (2)
(discretionary) liquidity traders (Adamati and Pfleiderer
(1988)) who prefer to wait until the information
asymmetry is reduced. Alternatively, if markets would
tend to over or under-react to earnings news, the excess
volume could merely reflect the activities of traders who
want to exploit this inefficiency.
Second, table III shows that, before the regulation,
abnormal trading volume was significantly positive (at at
least the 10's significance level) on day -8, -6, -5, -4
and -2. After the regulation excess trading volume is
only significantly positive (t - 1.63) on day -3. Table
IV confirms this result . after the regulation, the
trading volume fell significantly (at the 5ó significance
level or less) in the restricted period and its three
subperiods. Note also that the decline is most
pronounced in the 10 days period prior to the
announcement. Apparently, the law discouraged insider
trading in such a strong way that it led to a net
reduction in trading volume. Note that onlv the trading
volume in the restricted period is affected by the
regulation.
Tables V and VZ report the results for a subset of 28
"small" firms. Firms were ranked on the basis of equity
market value at the beginning of each year. Next, each15
year a portfolio containing the bottom 33á of firms was
formed. In order to make a comparison possible, only the
28 firms that remained "small" from 1985 to 1989 are
retained. Small firms are, on average more actively
traded (at least relative to the number of shares
outstanding) ..368 percent per day before 1987 and .299
percent per day afterwards (compared to .268 percent and
.216 percent for the total sample). A similar negative
correlation between trading volume and firm size is also
reported by Ajinkya and Jain (1989) in U.S. data.
The results for the behaviour of abnormal volume of small
firms are similar to the ones reported for the total
sample, but, because of the small sample size, less
significant.
Stocks are highly liquid during the announcement and
afterwards. Although after the regulation, the abnormal
trading volume actually increased (although not
significantly) in the restricted period P-40,-1~ the
trading volume decreased significantly (at the l0ó level
or lower) in the subperiods during which insider trading
was more likely . P-20,-1 and P-10,-1- Specifically,
table V shows that, after the introduction of the Model
Code, the average abnormal trading volume is negative in
8 out of the 10 days prior to the announcement. Note
that, although the results of table VI are less
statistically significant than the ones reported in table
IV, the size of the volume reduction per day in the 1016
days prior to earnings announcements is much more
important for small firms (.23) than for the total sample
(.098).
4.3 Results : semi-annual earninas
Tables VZI, VIII, IX and X are similar to tables III,
IV, V and VI respectively, but are now based on 554 semi-
annual earnings annoucements. Note that this time, the
restricted period and subperiod covers day -15 to day -1
and day -10 to day -1 respectively.
The results for semi-annual earnings are similar to the
ones reported for annual earnings. Excess trading volume
is significantly positive in the announcement period and
the post-announcement period. Moreover, there is no
evidence that firms became more liquid in the restricted
period after insider trading regulation was introduced :
average daily abnormal trading volume falls (although not
significantly) after 1986. As before, the decline is
more pronounced for small firms (compare tables VIII and
X). However, the volume declines are less important than
observed before annual earnings announcements. One
explanation for thís difference is that, prior to the
regulation, not much insider trading was going on before
semi-annual earnings announcements, so that the
regulation did not make much difference. The fact that
(prior to 1987) the 10 day pre-announcement abnormal
trading volume is smaller before semi-annual earnings
announcements than before annual earnings annoucements17
(0.065 vs. 0.155) is consistent with this hypothesis.
Why insiders would be more active prior to annual
earnings than prior to semi-annual earnings, remains to
be explained. Interestingly, Morse (1981) does not find
any abnormal tradíng volume behaviour prior to quarterly
earnings announcements of 25 U5 companies in the period
1973 - 1976. An alternative explanation (also consistent
with the data) is that the law was more effective (in
increasing outsiders' willingness to trade) for semi-
annual than for annual earnings announcements.
On the basis of these results hypothesis 1 is rejected.
In contrast to the regulators' intentions, the Model Code
reduced trading volume, or, at least, did not increase
trading volume. In il of the 12 comparisons of trading
volume (in the restricted period; see tables IV, VI, VIII
and X) trading volume declined (although not always
significantly) after the introduction of insider trading
regulatíon. The reduction in insider trading and the
resulting reduction in trading activity was apparently
not compensated by an increased willingness (by
uninformed traders) to trade.
5. THE EFFECT OF INSIDER TRADING RESTRICTIONS ON STOCK
PRICE BEHAVIOUR
5.1 Methodology : the Ball and Brown approach
In order to test for the effect of the regulation on the
speed of adjustment of stock prices to earnings news18
(hypothesis 2), we adopted, as a first pass, the classic
Ball and Brown (1968) approach. First, the sample was
split in two subsamples . companies that experiences an
increase in annual (semi-annual) earnings per share and
companies that experienced a decrease in annual (semi-
annual) earnings per share. If earnings follow a
seasonal random walk, then this procedure divides the
sample in companies with unexpected earnings increases
and decreases. Although time series models or models
based on analyst and managerial forecasts are better than
naive random walk models (for an overview, see e.g.
Foster (1986) Brown et al (1987)), no such data was
available to us.
Table XI provides an overview of our sample. The results
are based on 389 annual earnings increases, 160 annual
earnings decreases, 254 semi-annual earnings increases
and 137 semi-annual earnings decreases. Except for the
1987 semi-annual earnings announcements (announced mainly
in the two months prior to the stock market crash) and
the 1988 annual earnings reports, earnings increases are
always twice as numerous as earnings decreases.
Next, for each subsample of annual (and semi-annual)
earnings increases and decreases a standard event study
was performed using the Market Model to compute "normal"
returns, employing data in the estimation period. The
market index is an equally weighted index of all
securities in the sample. Estimates of u and B were19
obtained from simple OLS regressions, without adjustment
for thin trading. Brown and Warner (1985) show that the
failure to take into account nonsynchronous trading in
estimating Market Model coefficients does not result in
misspecification of event study methodologies . by
construction, OLS residuals for a security sum to zero in
the estimation period so that a bias in a is
compensated for a bias in B. As with the volume data,
the standard-deviation of the average abnormal return in
the estimation period is used to perform significance
tests in the test period. Note that this method
incorporates crossectional dependencies in security-
specific returns, which may be important if events are
clustered.
5.2 Results
The results for annual announcements are shown in figure
2 which is based on table XII, panel A(earnings
increases) and panel B(earnings decreases). Before the
introduction of insider trading restrictions, earnings
increase announcements are preceded by significant (at
the l0 percent level) stock price increases on day -l0, -
9, and day -7. The 1.89 percent cumulative excess return
in the l0 days prior to the announcement is highly
significant (t - 3.7). Although the announcement return
(.65 percent) is significantly positive, the earnings
news was largely anticipated. For earnings declines, the
10-day pre-announcement return (-.65 percent) is not
significantly different from zero (t --1.03) . However,20
the cumulative excess return of -3.2 percent in the
restricted period (day -40 to day -1) is marginally
significant (t - -1.59). Earnings declines are
unexpected : stock prices fall by 3.68 percent in a two-
day period. After day 1, excess returns are not
significantly different from zero.
Interestingly, after the reform, earnings news was not
preceded by abnormal positive or negative abnormal
returns. Annual earnings decreases are actually preceded
by a small (1 percent in 50 days) positive excess return
and the market's response to earnings news is uniquely
confined to a 2-day negative return of -2.22 percent.
The significant (t - 2.29) positive excess return on day
2 of .5 percent is difficult to explain in an efficient
market. In a similar way, the significant positive
response to earnings increases is largely limited to the
announcement day when stock prices increase by .52
percent.
It is tempting to relate the stock price behaviour to the
volume behaviour reported above. From tables III and IV,
we inferred that, before 1987, the abnormal trading
volume is significantly positive in the l0 days prior to
annual earnings announcements. After the introduction of
the Model Code, the cumulative abnormal volume falls and
becomes statistically insignificant. This suggests that
the pre-announcement returns and pre-announcement volume
patterns are closely related.zl
The results seem to be consistent with hypothesis 2: the
Model Code reduced the speed of adjustment to
information. However, the small information content of
earnings after 1986 suggests that our earnings
expec tations model is misspecified. This in itself will
reduce the efficiency of our test : each test is a joint
hypothesis of the information content and the speed of
adjustment to this information. If the earnings
expectation model does not separate well unexpected
earnings increases and decreases, the measured
information conter.t will biased toward zero, so that we
erroneously conclude that the speed of adjustment has
fallen.
When the analysis was repeated for small firms and around
semi-annual earnings announcements (results are available
upon request), the problem with the methodology became
even more striking : for all periods and subsamples, the
pre-announcement cumulative excess returns were zero,
which suggests that the earnings expectations model is
misspecified.
5.3 The weighted average anticipation time
As an alternative procedure individual stocks were ranked
on the basis of cumulative excess returns from day -40 to
day tl. The sample was divided into stocks with positive
excess returns and negative excess returns. While this
method guarantees a large "information content" of22
earnings announcements, it also implicitely assumes that
cumulative excess returns 40 days prior to earnings
announcements are uniquely caused by the earnings news.
For our purposes, it is sufficient to assume that the
distribution of non-earnings related company-specific
news is uniformally distributed across the sample period.
In order to measure the speed of adjustment in a period
starting T days before the earnings announcement (day -T)
until the announcement day (day 0), we compute the






where CAR-T is the cumulative average excess return from
day -T until day 0 and ARt is the average excess return
on day t. The WAAT corresponds to a duration measure
that standardises for the information content of the
earnings announcements. If all the information was
incorporated on day 0, the WAAT would be equal to 0. In
the other extreme case, where the market anticipated all
the information T days before the announcement, (i.e. all
ARt are 0 for t ~ T) the WAAT is equal to T. If the
conventional hypothesis is true that insiders make
markets efficient, we expect the WAAT to fall after 1987.
Table XIII shows the results for the total sample, and
for various subperiods in the restrícted period. In the
total 40-day restricted period prior to annual earnings23
announcements, the WAAT is approximately equal to 17
days. Note that if the cumulative average excess return
was evenly distributed over the entire 40 day holding
period, the WAAT should be equal to 20. Thus, the second
half of the restricted period generally produces larger
excess returns.
If the market had become less efficient, the WAAT should
have declined after insider trading restrictions were
reduced. Table XIII clearly does not support this
hypothesis. In 9 out of the 12 pariwise comparisons, the
anticipation time was longer after the introduction of
insider trading restrictions.
Table XIV reports the results for small firms. Comparing
table XIII and XIV, the average anticipation time seems
shorter for small firms than for the total sample (e.g.
13 days vs. 17 days in the 40-day period prior to annual
earnings announcements). This is to be expected as, for
small firms, typically less information is available
and~or revealed prior to earnings announcements. Again,
the hypothesis that insider trading restrictions make
markets less efficient is rejected . in 7 out of 12
pairwise comparisons the WAAT increases after the
introduction of the Model Code.24
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as
follows .(1) after the introduction of restrictions on
insider trading, trading volume fell before earnirrys
announcements; this finding was more significant before
annual earnings announcements than before semi-annual
earnings announcements, and especially important for
small firms during the restricted period, (2) after the
introduction of restrictions on insider trading, the
speed of adjustment to annual or semi-annual earnings
announcements waa not significantly effected.
These results are inconsistent with the conventional
wisdom about insider trading, i.e. that it makes markets
efficient and that it makes markets less liquid.
The volume results are consistent with Adamati and
Pfleiderer (1988) who argue that competition between
informed traders may actually increase liquidity trading
(and volume) because it reduces liquidity traders'
transaction costs. Of course, it would be ideal for
liquidity traders that no informed traders would trade,
but having a lot of information traders is better than
having just a few.
The finding that market efficiency and the speed of
adjustment to security prices are not reduced by the
reduction in the number of informed investors, is
consistent with the model proposed by Fishman and Hagerty25
(1989). The law eliminated only a fraction of the
(information) traders, i.e. the company executives, some
of which possess information and some of which do not.
Others, with higher information acquisition costs such as
financial analysts, would face less competition and woulà
be encouraged to spend more on information. As a result,
their analysis would become more accurate, which may have
offset the information reducing effect of the decline in
"insider" trading.
The regulatory implications are clear : the argument that
eliminating insiders will increase liquidity because of
increased confidence of outside investors, ignores the
liquidity enhancing role of insiders per se. Insiders
make markets, influence prices, and generate volume.
This is especially the case for relatively small firms.FOOTNOTES
1. One could question whether it is in the interest of
the current shareholders (which, as is standard in
Finance, the insiders-managers are assumed to maximize)
to make markets more efficient. To illustrate this
point, assume that at time 0 insiders receive information
which, without their trading activities would become
available at T~ 0. If insiders trade, their trading
activity will speed up the adjustment of information.
Consider the following three categories of current
shareholders: (1) Investors who hold their stock until
after time T; (2) Investors who would have sold their
stock before time T, whether the insider traded or not
and (3) Investors who sell their stock before time T
because of the buying pressure of insiders. While the
first category would be unaffected by insider trading,
some of the shareholders in the second category will
benefit if the trading speeds up the release of ood
information. However, if insider trading speeds up the
adjustment to bad information (i.e. the insider sells
short) the shareholders in the second category will be
made worse off. Finally, the third category (which is
only relevant when the insider acts on positive
information) will be made worse off if the trades are
only partially revealing. In short, insider tradíng on
the basis of negative information will always hurt
current shareholders, while the net effect of insider
buying is unclear: it depends on the ratio of "normal"versus "insider induced" trading volume and on the extent
and speed of information revelation.
2. Of course, we also adjusted for serial correlation,
but the results were not mutually affected.
3. Kyle (1985, 1989) developes a model of strategic
insider trading.
4. Because it is not clear when exactly the news becomes
publicly available, we have computed the "announcement
day returns" as the sum of the return on day 0 and day
fl.za
REFERENCES
Admati Anat and Paul Pfleiderer, 1988, "A theory of
intraday trading patterns: volume and price
variability", Review of Financial Studies, 1, 3-40
Ajinkya, Bipin and Prem Jain, 1989, "The behaviour of
daily stock market trading volume", Journal of
Accounting ~ Economics 11, 331-359
Amihud J. and Mendelsohn, 1986, "Asset pricing and the
bid-ask spread", Journal of Financial Economics 17,
223-249
Bagehot, Walter, "The only game in town", Financial
Analyst Journal, 27, 12-14
Ball Ray and Paul Brown, 1968, "An empricial evaluation
of accounting income numbers", Journal of Accounting
Research 6, 159-178
Bamber L.S., 1986, "The information content of annual
earnings release : a trading volume approach",
Journal of Accounting Research, 24, 40-56
Baron van Ittersum, B.F., 1989, "Misbruik van
voorwetenschap", Actiona, 39-53
Beaver, William, 1986, "The information content of annual
earnings announcements", Journal of Accounting
Research, 6, 67-92
Brown, L, P. Griffin, R. Hagerman and M. Zmijewski, 1987,
"An evaluation of alternative proxies for the
market's assessment of unexpected earnings", Journal
of Accounting and Economics 9, 159-193
Brown Steve and Jerold Warner, 1985, "Using daily stock
returns : the case of event studies", Journal of
Financial Economics, 14, 3-32
Finnerty, Joseph, 1976, "Znsiders and market efficiency",
Journal of Finance, 31, 1141-1148
Fishman, Michael and Kathleen Hagerty, 1989, "Insider
Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices", mimeo,
Northwestern University
Foster George, 1986 "Financial statement analysis",
Prentice-Hall
Givoly D. and D. Palmon, 1985, "Insider trading and the
exploitation of inside information : some empirical
evidence", Journal of Business, 58, 69-87Grossman, S., 1986, "An analysis of the role of insider
trading on futures markets", Journal of Business, 59,
119-146
Grossman, S and J. Stiglitz, 1960, "On the impossibility
of Informationally Efficient Markets", American
Economic Review, 70, 393-408.
Grossman, S., 1976, "On the efficiency of competitive
stock markets where traders have diverse
information", Journal of Finance 31, 573-585
Holthausen, Rober and Robert Verrechia, 1990, "The effect
of informedness and consensus on price and volume
behaviour", The Accounting Review, 65, 191-208
Jaffe J., 1974, "Special information and insider
trading", JournaZ of Business 47, 410-428
Karpoff, Jonathan, 1986, "A theory of trading volume",
Journal of Finance, 41, 1069-1087
Kyle, Albert, 1985, "Continuous auctions and insider
trading", Econometrica, 53, 1315-1336
Kyle, Albert, 1989, "Informed Speculation with Imperfect
Competition", Review of Economic Studies, 56, 317-356
Lakonishok, Josef and Theo Vermaelen, 1986, "Tax-induced
trading around ex-dividend days", Journal of
Financial Economics, 16, 287-319
Manove, Michael, 1989, "The harm from insider trading and
informed speculation", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 104, 823-844
Morse, Dale, 1981, "Price and trading volume reaction
surrounding earnings announcements", Journal of
Accounting Research, 19, 374-383
Seyhun, N., 1986, "Insiders profits, cost of trading and
market efficíency", Journal of Financíal Economics
16, 189-212Table I
MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS DATES













TOTAL 561 554TABLE II
Average daily trading volume on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (Figures in percent of shares outstanding)
Panel A : Yearlv Analvsis
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 PRE POST Total
Mean 0.187 0.315 0.302 0.192 0.198 0.300 0.268 0.216 0.244 Median 0.153 0.237 0.218 0.164 0.152 0.206 0.238 0.169 0.196 St. Dev. 0.166 0.339 0.263 0.200 0.171 0.326 0.214 0.176 0.182 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Maximum 1.087 2.424 1.530 1.216 0.959 2.014 2.424 2.014 2.424
Panel B: Estimation Period Analysis
1. Annual Earninqs
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 PRE POST Total
Mean 0.258 0.331 0.206 0.187 0.248 0.295 0.214 0.246 Median 0.182 0.256 0.145 0.147 0.153 0.217 0.154 0.177 St. Dev. 0.356 0.269 0.271 0.164 0.298 0.318 0.252 0.283 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Maximum 3.33 1.23 2.165 0.988 2.096 3.33 2.165 3.33
2. Semi-annual earnings
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 PRE POST Total
Mean 0.148 0.282 0.253 0.177 0.183 0.228 0.180 0.209 Median 0.113 0.217 0.178 0.141 0.133 0.156 0.136 0.145 St. Dev. 0.218 0.281 0.262 0.186 0.222 0.249 0.285 0.233 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Maximum 1.253 1.979 1.682 1.577 1.909 1.979 1.909 1.979TABLE II
Panel C: Event Period Analvsis
1. Annual earnings
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 PRE POST Total
Mean 0.319 0.359 0.218 0.218 0.298 0.339 0.244 0.282 Median 0.235 0.250 0.146 0.141 0.207 0.240 0.159 0.183 St. Dev. 0.344 0.323 0.423 0.242 0.366 0.334 0.353 0.349 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Maximum 2.648 1.697 4.343 1.605 2.745 2.648 4.343 4.343
2. Semi-annual earninqs
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 PRE POST Total
Mean 0.191 0.301 0.310 0.247 0.193 0.268 0.220 0.249 Median 0.104 0.205 0.204 0.142 0.137 0.173 0.139 0.154 St. Dev. 0.280 0.293 0.308 0.403 0.260 0.299 0.341 0.317 Minimum 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Maximum 1.824 1.548 1.982 3.446 2.312 1.982 3.446 3.44633
TABLE III
Averaqe (AV) and cumulative averaqe (CAV) abnormal daily trading volume
around annual earnings announcements
Abnormal volume is computed using the Market Model (equation (i)) as a
model of market equilibrium trading volume. Trading volume is defined as
the natural logaritm of 1 plus the number of shares traded, divided by the
number of shares outstandinq. The cumulative average abnormal trading
volume (CAVt) is computed from 50 days prior to the earninqs announcement
until l0 days afterwards. The left panel of the table is based on data
prior to the introduction of the Model Code.
PRE-REGUIàTION POST REGULATION
DAY AV CAV ta) AV CAV ta)
-50 0.026 0.026 0.25 0.070 0.070 0.78
-40 0.083 0.019 0.81 0.017 0.049 0.18
-30 0.024 -0.713 0.23 -0.072 0.076 -0.80
-20 0.115 -0.384 1.13 0.018 -0.715 0.20
-10 0.047 -0.050 0.46 -0.026 -0.780 -0.29
-9 0.107 0.057 1.04 0.031 -0.758 0.34
-8 0.309 0.366 3.03~~ 0.132 -0.626 1.48
-7 0.162 0.528 1.59 0.035 -0.591 0.39
-6 0.203 0.731 1.99~} -0.011 -0.601 -0.12
-5 0.251 0.982 2.46f~ 0.128 -0.474 1.43
-4 0.170 1.152 1.66~ -0.012 -0.486 -0.13
-3 0.024 1.176 0.23 0.146 -0.340 1.63~
-2 0.173 1.349 1.69~ 0.059 -0.281 0.66
-1 0.105 1.454 1.03 0.088 -0.193 0.98
0 0.475 ,1.928 4.66~~ 0.448 0.255 5.03~~
1 0.839 2.767 8.23~~ 0.938 1.193 10.53~~
2 0.483 3.250 4.74~~ 0.615 1.808 6.91~~
3 0.374 3.625 3.67~~ 0.417 2.225 4.67~~
4 0.243 3.868 2.39f~ 0.370 2.595 4.15~~
5 0.418 4.286 4.10~t 0.431 3.026 4.84~~
6 0.341 4.627 3.35~x 0.296 3.322 3.31~~
7 0.265 4.892 2.60~~ 0.259 3.581 2.91~~
8 0.282 5.174 2.77~~ 0.294 3.875 3.29~~
9 0.198 5.373 1.94~ 0.209 4.084 2.35~w
10 0.109 5.482 1.07 0.151 4.235 1.69~
a) t~tatistics ~ indicates value is significantly different from zero at
10~ level
~~ indicates value is significantly different from zero at
5i level or less.34
TABLE IV
Averaqe abnormal daily tzading volume around annual earninas announcements
in specific sub-periods
Sub-period Ptl t2 covers the period Prom day tl until day t2, relative to
the announcemei~t date. Abnormal volume is computed usinq the Market Model
(equation ( 1)) as a model of equilibrium trading volume. Tradinq volume
is defined as the natural logaritm of 1 plus the number of shares traded
divided by the number of shares outstanding. t-statistics are in
parenthesis. ~~ indicates that the value is siqnificantly different from
zero at the 5á significance level. i indicates that the value is
statistically significantly different from zero at the lOt significance
level.


















(4.81);f ( 2.02)~f (-2.29)~~
P0,1 0.656 0.693 0.036
(9.08)x~ (10.98)~~ (0.38)
PQSt-announcement
Pt2,10 0.301 0.331 0.036
(8.87)~t (11.39)~x (0.806)35
TABLE V
Average (AV) and cumulative average (CAV) abnormal daily tradinq volume
around annual earninas announcements for a subsample of 28 sma firms
Abnormal volume is computed usinq the Market Model (equation ( 1)) as a
model of market equilibrium tradinq volume. Trading volume is defined as
the natural logaritm of 1 plus the number of shares traded, divided by the
number of shares outstanding. The cumulative average abnormal trading
volume (CAVt) is computed from 50 days prior to the earnings announcement
until l0 days afterwards. The left panel of the table is based on data
prior to the introduction of the Model Code.
PRE-REGULATION POST REGULATION
DAY AV CAV ta AV CAV t
-50 0.095 0.095 0.38 0.180 0.180 0.80
-40 0.140 -1.882 0.56 0.047 0.833 0.21
-30 -0.440 -6.457 -1.77 -0.177 0.873 -0.78
-20 0.079 -8.602 0.319 - 0.343 -1.609 1.52
-10 -0.541 -10.286 -2.17~~ -0.189 -2.689 -0.84
-9 -0.020 -10.306 -0.08 -0.185 -2.875 -0.82
-8 0.379 -9.927 1.52 -0.328 -3.203 -1.46
-7 -0.088 -10.015 -0.35 -0.244 -3.446 -1.08
-6 0.184 -9.831 0.74 -0.191 -3.638 -0.85
-5 0.527 -9.305 2.12w~ 0.148 -3.489 0.66
-4 0.124 -9.180 0.50 -0.313 -3.802 -1.39
-3 -0.166 -9.347 -0.67 0.135 -3.668 0.59
-2 0.095 -9.252 0.38 -0.014 -3.682 -0.06
-1 0.361 -8.891 1.45 -0.236 -3.919 -1.05
0 0.259 -8.632 1.04 0.404 -3.515 1.79k
1 1.205 -7.427 4.85~~ 1.171 -2.344 5.21~~
2 0.383 -7.044 1.54 0.976 -1.367 4.34~~
3 0.288 -6.756 1.15 0.649 -0.718 2.89~w
4 0.296 -6.460 1.19 0.745 0.027 3.31~~
5 0.936 -5.523 3.77~~ 0.774 0.801 3.44~~
6 0.781 -4.743 3.14~t 0.253 1.054 1.12
7 0.293 -4.456 1.18 0.333 1.388 1.48
8 0.527 -3.922 2.12~~ 0.155 1.542 0.68
9 0.460 -3.462 1.85~ 0.321 1.864 1.43
10 0.247 -3.215 0.99 0.279 2.143 1.24
a) t-statistics t indicates value is siqnificantly different from zero at
lOt level
t~ indicates value is significantly different from zero
at Sg level or lessi Fi
TABLE VI
Average abnormal daily tradinq volume around annual earnincts announcements
in specific sub-periods for a subsample of 28 small firms
Sub-period Ptl t2 covers the period from day tl until day t2, relative to
the announcemeht date. Abnormal volume is computed using the Market Model
(equation ( 1)) as a model of equilibrium trading volume. Trading volume
is defined as the natural logaritm of 1 plus the number of shares traded
divided by the number of shares outstandinq. t-statistics are in
parenthesis. ~~ indicatea that the value is siqnificant~y different from
zezo at the Sg siqnificance level. ; indicates that the value is
statistically significantly different from zero at the 108 significance
level.
Period Pre-reaulation Post rewlation Post-Pre
Pre-restricted
P-50,-41 -0.202 0.088 0.29
(-2.s7)~~ (l.lo) (2.71)~t
Restricted
P-40,-1 -0.17 -0.118~~ 0.054
(-4.33)~~ (-3.32) (1.02)
P-30,-1 -0-096 -0.165 -0.069
(-z.12);i (-a.o2)~~ (-l.la)
P-20,-1 -0.015 -0.132 -0.117
(-0.27) (2.63)~~ (-1.63)~
P-10,-1 0.085 -0.141 -0.227
(1.08) (-1.98)t (-2.14)~~
Announcement
P-1,0 0.732 0.787 0.055
(4.16)~~ ( 4.94)~~ (0.23)
Post-announcement
P2,P0 0.468 0.498 0.031
(5.66)~w (6.65)~~ (0.27)TABLE VII
Average (AV) and cumulative average (CAV) abnormal daily trading volume
around annual announcements
Abnormal volume is computed usinq the Market Model (equation (i)) as a
model of market equilibrium trading volume. Trading volume is defined as
the natural logaritm of 1 plus the number of shares traded, divided by the
number of shares outstandinq. The cumulative average abnormal trading
volume (CAVt) is computed from 50 days príor to the earnings announcement
until 10 days afterwards. The left panel of the table is based on data
prior to the introduction of the Model Code.
PRE-REGULATION POST REGULATION
DAY AV CAV ta AV CAV t
-25 -0.022 -0.022 -0.18 0.036 0.036 0.36
-20 -0.067 -0.509 -0.57 -0.054 -0.002 -0.53
-15 -0.001 -0.728 -0.00 0.054 0.051 0.54
-10 0.117 -0.511 0.99 -0.062 -0.551 -0.62
-9 0.046 -0.465 0.39 -0.120 -0.671 -1.20
-8 0.019 -0.445 0.16 0.074 -0.596 0.74
-7 -0.049 -0.494 -0.41 0.080 -0.516 0.80
-6 0.017 -0.478 0.14 0.127 -0.390 1.27
-5 0.023 -0.455 0.19 0.078 -0.312 0.78
-4 0.146 -0.308 1.24 -0.034 -0.345 -0.33
-3 0.060 -0.248 0.51 0.097 -0.249 0.97
-2 0.139 -0.109 1.18 0.220 -0.029 2.21~~
-1 0.129 0.020 1.10 0.058 0.030 0.58
0 0.395 0.415 3.36~~ 0.237 0.267 2.38~~
1 0.777 1.192 6.61~w 1.017 1.284 10.21~i
2 0.557 1.749 4.74~~ 0.507 1.791 5.09~~
3 0.506 2.255 4.30tf 0.452 2.243 4.54}~
4 0.311 2.566 2.64~~ 0.294 2.537 2.95~~
5 0.338 2.904 2.87~~ 0.202 2.740 2.03~~
6 0.304 3.208 2.58~~ 0.123 2.862 1.23
7 0.373 3.582 3.17t~ 0.011 2.873 0.10
8 0.373 3.955 3.17~~ 0.106 2.979 1.06
9 0.167 4.122 1.42 0.091 3.071 0.91
10 0.112 4.234 0.95 0.078 3.148 0.78
a) t~statistics t indicates value is significantly different from zero at
lOg level
~~ indicates value is significantly different from zero at
5t level or lessTABLE VIII
Averaqe abnormal daily tradinq volume around semi-annual earninas
announcements in specific sub-periods.
Sub-period Pti t2 covers the period Erom day t1 until day t2, relative to
the announcemefit date. Abnormal volume is computed usinq the Market Model
(equation ( 1)) as a model of equilibrium tradinq volume. Trading volume
is defined as the natural loqaritm of 1 plus the number of shares traded
divided by the number of shares outstandinq. t-statistics are in
parenthesis. ~~ indicatea that the value is siqnificantly different from
zero at the Sá siqnificance level. ~ indicates that the value is
statistically siqnificantly different from zero at the 103 significance
level.
Pe 'o Pre-revulation Post reaulation Post-Pre
Pre-restricted










P0,1 0.586 0.627 0.041






Average (AV) and cumulative average (CAV) abnormal daily trading volume
around semi-annual announcemants for a subsample of small firms
Abnormal volume is computed usinq the Market Model (equation (1)) as a
model of market equilibrium trading volume. Trading volume is defined as
the natural logaritm of 1 plus the number of shares traded, divided by the
number of shares outstanding. The cumulative average abnormal tradinq
volume (CAVt) is computed from 50 days prior to the earnings announcement
until 10 days afterwards. The left panel of the table is based on data
prior to the introduction of the Model Code.
PRE-REGUI,ATION POST REGULATZON
DAY AV CAV ta AV CAV t
-25 -0.126 -0.126 -0.57 -0.320 -0.320 -1.01
-20 -0.000 -0.503 -0.00 -0.395 -1.475 -1.24
-15 -0.019 -0.473 -0.08 -0.268 -2.119 -0.84
-10 0.127 -0.570 0.58 -0.410 -4.339 -1.29
-9 0.024 -0.546 0.10 -0.416 -4.755 -1.31
-8 -0.031 -0.577 -0.14 0.003 -4.752 0.01
-7 -0.006 -0.583 -0.02 0.106 -4.646 0.33
-6 -0.018 -0.601 -0.08 0.054 -4.591 0,17
-5 -0.049 -0.650 -0.22 0.380 -4.211 1.20
-4 0.279 -0.371 1.27 -0.113 -4.324 -0.35
-3 -0.050 -0.421 -0.22 0.233 -4.091 0.73
-2 0.398 -0.023 1.81~ 0.584 -3.507 1.84~
-1 0.063 0.039 0.28 0.088 -3.419 0.27
0 0.639 0.679 2.91~~ -0.003 -3.422 -0.01
1 1.193 1.872 5.43~~ 1.491 -1.932 4.70w~
2 0.775 2.647 3.52~~ 0.769 -1.163 2.42~~
3 0.641 3.288 2.91~~ 0.998 -0.165 3.15~t
4 0.598 3.886 2.72~~ 0.451 0.286 1.42
5 0.456 4.342 2.07f~ 0.237 0.524 0.74
6 0.078 4.420 0.35 -0.033 0.490 -0.10
7 0.498 4.918 2.27tt 0.296 0.786 0.93~
8 0.702 5.620 3.19~~ 0.319 1.105 1.00
9 0.808 5.284 1.30 0.901 1.885 1.58
10 0.183 6.107 0.83 -0.128 1.477 -0.40
a) t-statistics ~ indicates value is significantly different from zero at
lOt level
~~ indicates value is significantly different from zero at
5~ level or less40
TABLE X
Average abnormal daily trading volume around semi-annual earnin.gs
announcements in specific sub-periods for a subsample of small firms.
Sub-period Ptl t2 covers tha period from day tl until day t2, relative to
the announcemeilt date. Abnormal volume is computed using the Market Model
(equation (1)) as a model of equilibrium trading volume. Trading volume
is defined as the natural logaritm of 1 plus the number of shares traded
divided by the number o! shares outstandinq. t-statistics are in
parentheses. it indicates that the value is siqnificantly different from
zero at the Si significance level. i indicates that the value is
statistically siqnificantly diflerent from zero at the l0á significance
level.
P~~ Pre-reuulation Post reaulation Post-Pre
P-25,-16 -0.045 -0.185 -0.131
(-0.65) (-1.84) (-1.15)
P-15,-1 0.033 -0.105 -0.137
(0.54) (-1.28) (-1.38)
P-10,-1 0.073 0.057 -0.022
(1.05) (0.50) (-0.18)
P0,1 0.916 0.741 -0.172
(5.85)x~ (3.30)~~ (-0.63)
P2,10 0.470 0.379 -0.092
(6.42)~t (3.59);w (-0.72)41
TABLE XI
Number of firms with earnings changes relative to that of the previous
year
Annual Earninas
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Increases 83 80 72 67 87
Decreases 27 31 34 45 23
110 111 106 112 110
Semi-annual Earninas
Increases 67 65 51 71
Decreases 29 30 50 28
96 95 101 99az
TABLE XZI
Average (AAR) and cumulative (CAR) average abnormal returns from 50 days
before annual earnings announcements until 10 days afterwards








AAR CAR ta AAR CAR t
-0.006 -0.006 -0.034 0.124 0.124 0.971
0.182 0.462 1.117 -0.001 0.532 -0.005
0.184 1.181 1.129 -0.033 -0.130 -0.255
-0.105 1.661 -0.641 0.051 -0.152 0.396
-0.150 1.920 -0.917 0.076 -0.332 0.596
-10 0.292 1.929 1.788~ -0.071 -0.365 -0.557
-9 0.323 2.252 1.979;~ 0.080 -0.285 0.625
-8 0.039 2.290 0.236 0.250 -0.035 1.953~
-7 0.342 2.632 2.098~~ -0.014 -0.049 -0.112
-6 0.138 2.770 0.847 0.030 -0.019 0.237
-5 0.177 2.947 1.083 -0.184 -0.203 -1.438
-4 0.135 3.082 0.828 -0.213 -0.416 -1.664~
-3 0.067 3.149 0.411 0.095 -0.321 0.742
-2 0.189 3.337 1.158 0.185 -0.136 1.448
-1 0.184 3.521 1.129 0.056 -0.079 0.440
0 0.647 4.168 3.969~~ 0.516 0.436 4.029~~
1 -0.258 3.910 -1.583 0.064 0.500 0.500
2 -0.152 3.759 -0.929 -0.112 0.388 -0.875
3 0.067 3.826 0.411 -0.209 0.179 -1.6]5
4 -0.010 3.816 -0.061 -0.206 -0.027 -1.607
5 -0.164 3.652 -1.003 -0.072 -0.098 -0.560
6 -0.077 3.576 -0.469 0.150 0.052 1.174
7 -0.128 3.448 -0.782 -0.007 0.045 -0.052
8 -0.108 3.740 -0.667 -0.063 -0.017 -0.490
9 -0.213 3.127 -1.307 -0.238 -0.256 -1.862~
10 0.091 3.219 0.561 0.135 -0.121 1.055
a) t-statistics } indicates value is siqnificantly different from zero at
108 level
~~ indicates value is significantly different from zero at
5~ level or less4i
Panel B- Annual Earninas Decreases
PRE-REGULATION POST-REGULATION
DAY AAR CAR ta AAR CAR t
-50 -0.044 -0.044 -0.136 0.244 0.244 1.204
-40 0.041 -1.418 0.127 0.222 0.826 1.094
-30 -0.563 -3.165 -1.736~ 0.030 1.594 0.146
-20 0.131 -4.230 0.404 -0.401 1.271 -1.977~~
-15 0.026 -4.950 0.080 -0.341 0.939 -1.680f
-10 0.105 -3.827 0.324 )0.184 0.928 -0.908
-9 -0.673 -4.499 -2.076~~ -0.132 0.796 -0.652
-g 0.128 -4.371 0.395 0.204 1.000 1.003
-7 -0.002 -4.373 -0.006 -0.092 0.908 -0.452
-6 -0.017 -4.390 -0.051 0.072 0.980 0.355
-5 -0.298 -4.487 -0.918 0.156 1.136 0.768
-4 0.118 -4.570 0.363 0.149 1.285 0.732
-3 0.155 -4.415 0.477 -0.023 1.262 -0.113
-2 0.052 -4.363 0.160 0.223 1.485 1.100
-1 -0.295 -4.658 -0.910 0.288 1.773 1.420
0 -0.884 -5.542 -2.728~~ -0.717 1.056 -3.532~~
1 -2.793 -8.336 -8.620~~ -1.515 -0.459 -7.465~~
2 -0.128 -8.463 -0.395 0.465 0.006 2.292
3 0.498 -7.965 1.537 -0.153 -0.146 -0.752
4 -0.133 -8.098 -0.409 -0.246 -0.392 -1.210
5 0.575 -7.523 1.775~ -0.246 -0.638 -1.212
6 -0.022 -7.545 -0.068 -0.042 -0.680 -0.205
7 -0.119 -7.663 -0.366 0.089 -0.591 0.438
8 -0.193 -7.857 -0.597 0.250 -0.340 1.233
9 -0.035 -7.892 -0.108 0.308 -0.032 1.519
10 0.409 -7.483 1.262 -0.117 -0.149 -0.576
a) t-statistics ~ indicates value is significantly different from zero at
l0á level
~~ indicates value is significantly different from zero at
Sg level or less44
TABLE XZZI
The weighted averaqe anticipation time (WAAT) of earnings announcements in
the restricted period (total samole) for various subperiods, before and


















P-15, 0 Zncreases 4.675 5.335
Decreases 4.386 4.344
P-10, 0 Zncreases 2.440 3.749
Decreases 2.349 2.516
Subperiod Ptl, 0 covers the period from tl days before the announcement
dateTABLE XIV
The weighted averaqe anticipation time (wAAT) of earninqs announcements in
the restricted period (small firms) for various subperiods, before and











P-20, 0 Increases 7.182 6.206
Decreases 5.39 5.729
P-10, 0 Increases 2.326 3.844
Decreaes 2.165 1.936
Semi-Annual Earninas
P-15, 0 Increases 3.534 4.4
Decreases 3.915 2.376
P-10, 0 InCreases 1.684 1.999
Decreases 2.506 0.726
Subperiod Ptl, 0 covers the period from tl days before the announcement
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